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Abstract 
We analyze whether the effects of human resource practices on workers’ wages and firm 
productivity are similar or different. We find that firms’ wage policies overestimate the relevance 
of sector-specific skills and underestimate the productivity enhancing effect of computer skills. 
Moreover, only the firm benefits from performance related pay, whereas only the workers 
benefit from performance evaluation interviews. Finally, our estimation results show that in 
small firms a more advanced HRM system may not result in a convergence of interests between 
workers and the firm. 
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1 Introduction 
In this study we examine to what extent human resource practices affect workers’ wages and 
firm level productivity. This investigation allows us to examine the extent to which the firm as 
well as its workforce benefit from particular human resource management (HRM) practices. Or 
to put it in different terms: Whether the wage policy of the firm stimulates a convergence of the 
interests of the workforce with firm interests.  
We will present an “insider-econometric analysis” (Ichniowski & Shaw, 2003) of the 
effects of HRM practices in Dutch pharmacies at the individual firm level, controlling for both 
workforce and firm characteristics. Our analysis focuses on the “core” workers in the 
pharmacies: the pharmacist’s assistants.1 The advantage of this “jobs-based approach” (Lazear, 
1995) is that we are able to analyze a category of workers that is homogeneous with respect to 
their occupation as well as their educational background.2  
We will analyze the effects of specific HRM practices as well as the effects of more 
consistent HRM systems, ranging from traditional workplace relations to a “High Involvement 
Management” (HIM) system. We distinguish between various HRM policies related to 
recruitment, human capital (i.e. human resource development), employability, incentive pay and 
fringe-benefits offered to employees.  
We constructed linked employer-employee data, relating the data of an employers survey 
we conducted among pharmacies in the Netherlands to administrative data on the workforce and 
the productivity of the firms. The administrative data enable us to use a physical measure of 
productivity related to the pharmacies sector.3 the number of prescription-lines delivered to 
customers. These prescription-lines directly measure a pharmacy’s production, as there are only 
minor differences in the workload between delivering different medicines. 
Our study contributes to the literature on the effects of HRM in several ways. First, our 
study is the first to systematically analyze linked employer-employee data to determine whether 
the effects of various HRM practices on firm performance differ from the effects on the 
remuneration of the workforce. Second, our analysis allows us to test whether workers’ wages 
are more affected by institutionalized practices in salary scales than by workers’ real contribution 
to firm performance. From this perspective, we can examine whether traditional proxies of 
workers’ skills acquired on the job, such as workers’ age and job tenure, really affect workers’ 
                                                 
1. See Arthur (1992), Osterman (1994, 2000) and Batt (2002) for a similar approach. Osterman defines 
these ‘core workers’ as the largest group of non-supervisory, non-managerial workers at the 
establishment of a firm who are directly involved in making the product or providing the service. 
2.  In the Netherlands a person is only allowed to work as a pharmacist’s assistant if he or she is a 
graduate from a pharmacist’s assistants school. 
3.  Arthur (1994), MacDuffie (1995) and Ichniowski et al. (1997) also use physical measures of 
productivity related to the branch they analyze. These kind of sector specific performance measures 
can be considered as relatively ‘hard’ data on the performance of a firm (Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, 
Olson & Strauss, 1996). 
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productivity or merely reflect institutionalized practices in salary scales. Third, with respect to 
the human capital of the workforce, other studies of the effects of HRM practices merely focus 
on workers’ participation in training. In this study we will also take account of the actual “stock” 
of skills (i.e. workers’ scores on the various relevant competences) by which the human capital 
embedded in a firm’s workforce may contribute to firm performance and workers’ wages. 
Fourth, the linked employer-employee data facilitates an analysis of the extent to which the skills 
of the workers are rewarded according to their relevance to the firm. This allows us to analyze 
whether firms could gain from aligning their wage policies with a worker’s contribution to firm 
performance. Fifth, our analysis of the effectiveness of more advanced HRM systems in 
pharmacies contributes to the extension of the findings on the effects of HIM/High Performance 
systems in manufacturing plants to the service sector, where a growing majority of the working 
population is employed (cf. Batt, 2002). Finally, we focus on the core workers in small firms, 
whereas almost all studies of the effectiveness of HRM practices are set in large firms. 
Therefore, our analysis contributes to the understanding of the thresholds in the diffusion of 
more advanced HRM system among smaller firms. 
 
 
2 Prior Research 
In the literature on the effects of HRM practices at the firm level, two avenues of research exist. 
First, the human capital literature focuses on the effects of training at the firm level. Although 
empirical human capital research traditionally focuses on the earnings function of the individual 
worker, a stream of research is emerging that analyzes the effects of human capital investments 
at the firm level. The second line of research has developed from the HRM or personnel 
economics literature (see Wood, 1999; Ichniowski & Shaw, 2003 for an overview of these 
studies). In this literature, the effects of miscellaneous HRM practices are analyzed, although 
most authors attempt to focus on the effects of consistent ‘HRM systems’ (e.g. Arthur, 1994; 
Ichniowski, Shaw & Prennushi, 1997), with a special interest in the so-called High Performance 
Workplace (Ichniowski & Shaw, 2003).  
 
2.1 Studies of the Effects of Human Resource Development 
In the human capital literature, many studies have analyzed the effects of training on workers’ 
wages. Several studies found considerable returns on workers’ participation in training (e.g. 
Lynch, 1994). However, after controlling for selectivity, Goux & Maurin (2000) found that 
training has no real effect on workers’ wages. It should be noted, however, that studies analyzing 
the effects of training on wages could underestimate the effect of training on productivity. As 
human capital theory has shown, the productivity effects of training are only fully reflected in 
workers’ wages when the training is general, and assuming a perfectly competitive labor market. 
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The relationship between wage increases and productivity increases varies based on whether the 
firm or the worker pays the costs of training, which is related to the structure of the labor market. 
If the labor market is characterized by imperfect competition, bargaining and rent-sharing may 
occur (cf. Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999). Moreover, apart from their wages, 
workers may receive some kind of non-financial remuneration, and part of the returns to their 
human capital may be ‘backloaded’ towards the end of their careers to ensure their loyalty to the 
firm (Lazear, 1979). 
In the human capital literature, it is broadly recognized that apart from workers’ 
participation in training, workers acquire many work-related skills by means of informal on-the-
job training or ‘experience’ (cf. Mincer, 1974). In empirical analyses this informal human 
resource development is measured by proxies such as a worker’s tenure (an indicator of the firm-
specific skills a worker has acquired on the job) and a worker’s age (an indicator of the general 
skills a worker has acquired on the job) (e.g. Brown, 1989; Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998). These 
empirical studies generally show that workers’ experience contributes to their productivity, in as 
far as this is indicated by the wages they earn. One might, however, wonder whether workers’ 
experience really contributes to their productivity. This question was already posed in the early 
human capital literature (Mincer, 1974). Workers’ life-cycle earnings growth might reflect 
institutional arrangements in salary-scales rather than productivity gains, and need not 
necessarily reflect the productivity enhancing effects of the various skills workers have (cf. 
Medoff & Abraham, 1980, 1991; Brown, 1989). 
The studies mentioned above analyze the effects of training and informal human resource 
development on workers’ wages. Far fewer studies exist that analyze the effects of these factors 
on the productivity of the firm. Moreover, the results of these studies are highly dependent on the 
estimation technique, the definition of training and the measure of productivity (cf. Ballot, 
Fakhfakh & Taymaz, 2001). Some authors have found positive effects of training on the 
productivity of the firm Holtzer, Block, Cheatham & Knott (1993), Bartel (1994) and Dearden, 
Reed & Van Reenen (2000). Black & Lynch (2001), however, did not find an effect of the 
number of employees trained on the productivity of the firm, whereas Barrett & O’Connell 
(2001) found that general training has a positive effect on productivity growth whereas specific 
training has no effect. Dearden, et al. (2000), meanwhile, found that the effects of training on 
wages are about half the size of the effects on industrial productivity. However, they did not 
focus on the productivity of individual firms, but on the productivity of the sector of industry.4  
It is important to note that, with respect to the human capital embedded in the workforce of 
a firm, studies of the effects of human resource development (HRD) on firms’ productivity 
merely focus on participation in training, and do not include aggregate measures of workers’ 
stock of training investments nor the level of the relevant skills of the workers (cf. Lynch, 1998). 
                                                 
4.   They combine Labor Force Survey data on individual workers with data on the value added per sector 
of industry in manufacturing. 
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As the existing human capital literature is not conclusive regarding the effects of HRD on 
workers’ wages and firm productivity, the following alternative hypotheses can be stated: 
• Hypothesis 1a: Human Resource Development will have positive effects on both firm 
productivity and workers’ wages.  
• Hypothesis 1b:  Human Resource Development will have different effects for workers and the 
firm that employs them. 
 
2.2 Studies on the Effects of Human Resource Management 
In the HRM or personnel economics literature, several arguments can be found for the expected 
positive relation between HRM practices and a firm’s productivity (cf. Wolf & Zwick, 2002). 
First, as has been discussed above, investments in the human capital of the workforce may 
increase the productivity of workers (e.g. Bartel, 1994). Second, as the literature on the High 
Performance Workplace emphasizes, ‘good’ HRM policies may increase the motivation of 
workers (Ichniowski et al., 1997; Wood, 1999). Third, increasing the autonomy and 
responsibilities of the workers may diminish waste and inefficiencies because it enables the firm 
to take advantage of the specific knowledge of non-managerial workers  (Appelbaum, Berg, 
Bailey & Kalleberg, 2000; Preuss, 2003). Fourth, ‘good’ HRM policies may contribute to 
workers’ commitment to their tasks and willingness to do a better job (Ichniowski et al., 1997). 
Batt (2002) supports this argument and its application to the service sector. She found that high 
commitment of the workforce contributes to the effectiveness of employee-customer interaction 
in service-sector firms. Fifth, good HRM policies reduce quit rates, which, in turn, decreases 
recruitment and selection costs, and increases the benefits of investments in firm-specific skills. 
Moreover, in the service sector, employee turnover might induce customer turnover (Arthur, 
1994; Huselid, 1995; Batt, 2002). Finally, giving more responsibility to the work floor enables 
the firm to delayer the organization, thereby reducing the costs of the middle management 
(Appelbaum et al., 2000). 
Several studies have found that HRM practices have a positive effect on a firm’s 
productivity, although there is usually no clear effect attributable to specific practices (Youndt, 
Snell, Dean & Lepak, 1996; Ichniowski et al., 1997). The latter might be due to multicollinearity 
among the various HRM practices, as several practices are strongly correlated (Wolf & Zwick, 
2002), or may reflect the argument that only consistent bundles of HRM practices are effective 
(Arthur, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw & Prennushi, 1997).  Many studies have 
emphasized the complementariness of various HRM practices. Milgrom & Roberts (1995) 
developed a formal model in which the various HRM practices of a firm are seen as symmetric 
Edgeworth complements, in the sense that doing more of any one of these practices increases the 
returns of doing additional practices. The emerging literature on  High Involvement Management 
(HIM) or the High Performance Workplace (HPW) focuses particularly on the internal fit of the 
various HRM practices. A HIM strategy focuses on increasing the commitment of the personnel 
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to the firm in which they work. The focus of HPW is broader and highly related to Total Quality 
Management (TQM), which is based on both the internal and organizational fit of a firm’s HRM 
policies.5 
Arthur (1994) found that steel mills that use an HRM ‘commitment system’ have higher 
productivity levels than those that do not. Others have found that the HPW has significant 
positive effects on firm productivity (Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski, et al., 1997; Batt, 2002; Wolf & 
Zwick, 2002). Other studies, however, did not find clear effects of HRM systems or bundles of 
HRM practices on productivity (e.g. Delaney & Huselid, 1996).6 Kelley (1996) found that HPW 
practices do not affect the performance of single-plant firms, whereas Batt (2002) found that 
HIM practices do not pay off in small firms that operate on local markets with a restricted scope 
of their market. Cappelli & Neumark (2001) found no consistent effects of HPW practices on 
firm performance. Wood (1999) stated that the inconsistent findings from the studies on the 
effects of HRM might also be due to the fact that it is crucial for the effectiveness of HIM that 
there are no “Taylorist jobs” that restrict workers’ autonomy. If workers are merely involved in 
perfecting the design of a routinized job, this will not increase a firm’s performance.  
In the literature, only a few studies investigate to what extent employees benefit from more 
advanced HRM systems. Osterman (2000) addressed the question of whether firms with a HPW 
are “mutual gain enterprises”. However, he did not find any benefits of HPW practices for a 
firm’s core workforce, in terms of a lower layoffs rates and/or higher average real wage increase. 
He also found that firms with a HPW have higher layoff rates of regular employees. Black & 
Lynch (2000) found that reengineering a workplace to incorporate high performance practices 
increases workers’ wages, whereas profit sharing or stock option plans result in lower regular 
wages. Bauer & Bender (2001) found that especially the flattening of the hierarchy structure of 
an establishment and the introduction of self-managed teams positively affect the wages of 
employees. Meanwhile, Cappelli & Neumark (2001) also analyzed the effects of HPW practices 
on both the sales of the firm and labor costs (cf. Batt, 2001). The latter can, however, not be 
considered as benefits of these HPW practices for the workforce, as the analysis of labor costs 
does not control for the effects of workers’ characteristics, such as their level and field of 
education and work experience. 
As we discussed above, the empirical literature on the effects of HRM is quite inconclusive 
regarding the effects of particular HRM practices and systems for workers as well as the firms 
that employ them. Particularly for the small firms in the service sector we analyze, it is not clear 
whether these firms and their workers will benefit from a more advanced HRM system. We will, 
therefore, test the following two sets of alternative hypotheses: 
                                                 
5.  However, the HPW is sometimes used as a synonym of HIM and definitions overlap (cf. Lawler, 
Mohrman & Ledford, 1995). 
6.  Wood (1999) concludes in his overview study that the effects of HRM systems found vary between 
performance indicators. 
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• Hypothesis 2a: Human Resource Management practices will have positive effects on both 
firm productivity and workers’ wages.  
• Hypothesis 2b: Human Resource Management practices will have different effects for 
workers and the firm that employs them. 
• Hypothesis 3a:  A more advanced Human Resource Management system will have positive 
effects on both firm productivity and workers’ wages. 
• Hypothesis 3b: A more advanced Human Resource Management system will have different 
effects for workers and the firm that employs them. 
 
2.3 Measures of Productivity 
In studies of the effects of HRM practices, various indicators of a firm’s performance have been 
used: perceptual measures of firms’ performance (Delany & Huselid, 1996), financial measures 
such as firms’ profits (e.g. Terpstra & Rozell, 1993) or Tobin’s q (e.g. Huselid, 1995)7, the value 
added or sales of the firm per employee (Black & Lynch, 2001; Cappelli & Neumark 2001), or 
physical measures of firms’ productivity (e.g. Arthur, 1994).  
A disadvantage of a perceptual measure is that it can be highly subjective both in the 
judgment of firm performance itself, and in the selection of a comparator firm one selects to 
benchmark the performance of one’s own firm. Other measures - financial measures and value 
added - are affected by many systematic and ad hoc factors for which it is very difficult to 
control. Moreover, these measures, in practice, are often highly volatile. Physical measures of 
productivity do not have these disadvantages because they are straightforward in measuring 
productivity given the specific production process in a sector of industry (cf. Ichniowski & 
Shaw, 2003). 
In this study we will therefore use a physical measure of productivity, following the 
research of other studies that focus on a particular industry (Arthur, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995; 
Ichniowski, et al., 1997). We measure the productivity of pharmacies by the number of 
prescription lines delivered to customers. Each prescription line refers to a particular medicine 
delivered to a customer. Family doctors write these prescription lines, this being the only way in 
which registered medicines can be obtained in the Netherlands. The average number of 
prescription lines per assistant is a good indicator of the productivity of a pharmacy, since it 
determines the quantity of medicines delivered to customers: Although some differences may 
exist in the time it takes to deliver different medicines, no substantial differences in the 
composition of the medicines delivered by the various pharmacies exist.8 Moreover, the 
pharmacies are paid a fixed amount of money for each prescription line (€ 5.08) by the health 
                                                 
7.  i.e. the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement value of its assets. 
8.  It should be noted that in the Netherlands non-registered medicines are almost always bought in 
commercial drugstores and hardly contribute to the sales of the pharmacies. 
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insurance companies.9 In this way our measure of physical productivity is directly related to the 
value added of the firm. 
 
 
3 Data 
We conducted an employers survey among pharmacies in the Netherlands in November 2001.10 
A written questionnaire was mailed to 1,319 pharmacists of whom 549 responded. The response 
appeared to be unbiased with respect to region and pharmacy size. We were able to link the 
survey data with the available administrative data on the number of prescription lines worked up 
in the various pharmacies and with administrative data on workers’ wages and other worker 
characteristics.11 The latter data source was used to calculate the assistants’ average gross wages 
per month12, as well as workers’ average age and tenure for each pharmacy.  
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables in the data set used. The 
average gross wage per month for assistants working in a pharmacy is € 1,770. On  average, an  
assistant in a pharmacy  handles 13,630 prescription  lines  per year. The table also includes 
some controls for firm and workforce characteristics we will use in our analysis: 70 percent of 
the pharmacies are independent firms; the remaining ones are part of a chain. 53 percent of the 
pharmacies has more than 10 employees. The “core” workers on which we focus our analysis 
(i.e. the pharmacist’s assistants) represent 80 percent of the total workforce in the pharmacies. 
The rest of the workforce consist of two other groups of workers: the ‘second pharmacists’13 and 
‘other workers’ (usually cleaning personnel and administrative staff). Technological innovations, 
in the form of the introduction of a new computer system, took place in 17 percent of all 
pharmacies. Organizational innovations are more common. 56 percent of the pharmacies had to 
deal with organizational changes. In addition, 15 percent introduced new products in the shop, 
and 60 percent mentioned that customer orientation had increased. 
The HRM practices we include in the analyses can be classified as recruitment practices, 
human capital or HRD, employability practices, incentive pay and benefits offered to the 
pharmacist’s assistants. The recruitment policy variables show that few assistants have 
temporary contracts (on average 13 percent in a pharmacy). Although the labor market for 
                                                 
9. Although  pharmacies in the Netherlands have to deal with all kinds of government regulations, they 
are truly independent, for-profit firms. 
10.  In the tradition of “insider econometrics”, we based this survey on extensive fieldwork to get a 
detailed understanding of the production process in the Dutch pharmacies. 
11. All pharmacist’s  assistants are registered at the pension fund (Pensioenfonds Medewerkers 
Apotheken). 
12.  The gross wages per month are based on fulltime jobs (36 hours per week). 
13. Second pharmacists are pharmacists employed by the managing pharmacist who usually owns the 
firm. 
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pharmacy assistants was tight at the moment of the survey, only 13 percent of the pharmacies 
offered higher wages to new assistants in the case of vacancies 
 
Table 1 
Description of the variables* 
 
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
   
Wages and Productivity   
• Assistants’ average gross wages per month in euros (x 1,000) 1.77 .11 
• Number of prescription lines per assistant per year (x 1,000) 13.63 4.89 
Firm characteristics   
• Type of pharmacy   
 - Independent (yes/no) .70 .46 
 - Chain of less than 5 pharmacies (yes/no) .18 .38 
 - Chain of 5 or more pharmacies (yes/no) .13 .33 
• More than 10 employees (yes/no) .53 .50 
• Share of second pharmacists in total number of employees .05 .08 
• Share of other employees in total number of employees .15 .11 
Workforce characteristics   
• Assistants’ average age in years 36.61 4.39 
• Assistants’ average job tenure in years 6.89 2.73 
Technological and organizational innovations   
• New computer system (yes/no) .17 .37 
• Organizational changes (yes/no) .56 .50 
• New products (yes/no) .15 .36 
• Increased customer orientation (yes/no) .60 .49 
Recruitment policy   
• Assistants with temporary contracts (%) 12.60 16.58 
• Offering higher wages to new assistants in case of vacancies (yes/no) .13 .34 
Human capital (HRD)   
• Assistants’ average score on general skills higher than 7.5 (yes/no) .63 .48 
• Assistants’ average score on specific skills higher than 7.5 (yes/no) .28 .45 
• Assistants’ average score on computer skills higher than 7.5 (yes/no) .34 .48 
• Number of general courses enrolled in per assistant per year .15 .38 
• Number of specific courses enrolled in per assistant per year .75 .76 
• Number of computer courses enrolled in  per assistant per year .07 .20 
• Assistants take courses during work hours   
 - No courses (yes/no) .50 .50 
 - Few courses (yes/no) .29 .56 
 - Most courses (yes.no) .17 .38 
 - All courses (yes/no) .04 .19 
• Training of employees in case of vacancies (yes/no) .10 .30 
• Worker performance evaluation interview (yes/no) .75 .43 
• Personal development plan for assistants (yes/no) .07 .25 
Employability   
• Assistants performing tasks of pharmacist (yes/no) .55 .50 
• Assistants performing tasks of lower-level jobs (yes/no) .34 .48 
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Table 1 (continued)   
Description of the variables*   
   
Variable 
 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
 
   
• Assistants working overtime (yes/no) .74 .44 
Incentive pay   
• Performance pay (yes/no) .16 .36 
Additional benefits   
• Additional childcare facilities (yes/no) .19 .39 
• Flexible working hours (yes/no) .43 .50 
• Number of ‘fringe benefits’**   
 - low: 0 to 2 benefits (yes/no) .34 .48 
 - medium: 3 or 4 benefits (yes/no) .55 .50 
 - high: 5 or more benefits (yes/no) .11 .31 
   
*  n = 549 
**   subsidy for commuting expenses, product discounts, a free bicycle or car, a subsidy for a home 
computer, a clothing allowance, tax free savings.   
 
For human capital development we include variables that measure the competences of the 
workforce, and the participation in training, as well as facilities that may increase the quality of 
human capital investments like worker performance evaluation interviews. Moreover we 
distinguish between general skills, sector-specific skills and computer skills. The skills of 
assistants can be interpreted as the assistants’ stock of human capital. Because all the assistants 
have attended the same government required education program, their skills will, to a large 
extent indicate workers’ stock of training investments during their working career (cf. Lynch, 
1998). The human capital variables show that assistants have a high score on general 
competencies, such as social skills, independence, and dealing with responsibility. They score 
somewhat lower on specific competences, such as knowledge of medicines and preparation of 
medicines, and on computer competences.14 Assistants follow quite a few courses, mainly in the 
pharmaceutical  field. About half of them followed one or more courses during work time in the 
last twelve months. 10 percent of the pharmacies train their employees in response to vacancy 
problems. 75 percent hold worker performance evaluation interviews, but only 7 percent use 
personal development plans for assistants.  
The employability measures indicate whether pharmacists consider their assistants to be 
flexible in their tasks and working hours. 55 percent of the assistants perform tasks of the 
pharmacist, 34 percent perform tasks of lower-level jobs. 74 percent (occasionally) work 
overtime. Performance pay is used by 16 percent of the pharmacies. Finally, Table 1 gives an 
                                                 
14.  The competence scores refer to the score scales from 1 to 10 common in Dutch education, in which a 
score of 6 is a passing grade. A score of 7.5 is in between “amply sufficient” (7) and “good” (8). 
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overview of the additional benefits pharmacies offer their personnel. 19 percent of the 
pharmacies offer additional childcare facilities, whereas 43 percent of pharmacies offer the 
option of flexible working hours to their assistants. 11 percent of the pharmacies offer more than 
five other fringe benefits, such as a subsidy for commuting expenses, subsidized transportation in 
the form of a free bicycle or a car, product discounts, a clothing allowance, a subsidy for a home 
computer project, and tax free savings. 
 
 
4 Econometric specifications and estimation results 
To analyze the effects of the various HRM practices on workers’ wages and the productivity of 
the firm (Hypotheses 1a & 1b and 2a & 2b), we estimate the effects of  the various practices in a 
wage equation as well as a production function. We estimate these two equations as a set of 
‘seemingly unrelated regression equations’ (Zellner, 1962). By using EGLS estimators we are 
able to use the information on the explanatory variables that are only included in the second 
equation when estimating the first equation and allow for correlation between the two error 
terms: 
 
iiiiii XTIOIHLWIn 1
'
11
'
1
'
11)/( εµγδβα +++++=  (1) 
iiiiiii LZInXTIOIHLPIn 2
'
2
'
22
'
2
'
22 )/()/( εφµγδβα ++++++=  (2) 
 
Wi = total wages of pharmacist’s assistants in firm i; Li = number of full-time assistants in firm i; 
Pi= number of prescription lines delivered in firm i; Hi= use of various HRM-practices in firm i; 
OIi = organizational innovations in firm i; TIi = technological innovations in firm i; Xi = control 
variables; Zi = additional staff; α,  β’, δ’, γ, µ’, φ’ = (vectors of) coefficients; ε1i , ε2i  = error 
terms. 
In the first equation we analyze the effect of HRM practices on the wage level of the 
pharmacist’s assistants. Although in human capital literature workers’ wages are often used to 
measure their productivity, we will use the average wage level of the pharmacist’s assistants 
merely as a measure of the extent to which they benefit themselves from their human capital and 
the various HRM practices of the firm. The second equation is a production function in which we 
estimate the effects of HRM practices on the average productivity of the pharmacist’s assistants 
assuming constant returns to scale (cf. Black & Lynch, 2001). As mentioned above, we measure 
the productivity of the firm by the average number of prescription lines delivered by 
pharmacist’s assistants to the firm’s customers.  
We do not include data on the physical capital used in the pharmacies in the production 
function. However, as the production process in the various pharmacies is rather similar, the 
capital stock invested in the firm will be strongly related to the size of the workforce. Moreover, 
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in both equations we include variables that take into account the technological (TI) and 
organizational innovations (OI) that may have taken place in the pharmacy. Both technological 
and organizational innovations have been found to contribute to higher levels of firm 
productivity (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2002), and may also result in an increase in 
workers’ wages (Bauer & Bender, 2001). 
As mentioned, in our analysis we distinguish between several categories of HRM practices: 
recruitment practices, human capital development, employability practices, incentive pay, and 
benefits. It should be noted, however, that fringe-benefits might have a positive effect on 
workers’ productivity, but at the same time may result in a negative effect on wages in so far as 
there are hedonic or “compensating wages”. Finally, we include some control variables related to 
firm and workforce characteristics (see table 2). These controls differ between the two equations, 
since in the production function (equation 2) we have to add additional controls for the other 
categories of workers in the pharmacies (cf. Black & Lynch, 2001), i.e. the ratio between other 
staff employed, and pharmacist’s assistants. In order to impose constant returns to scale, we take 
the log transformation of the latter term.  
Table 2 shows the estimation results of the equations 1 and 2. Wages are strongly related to 
the age and job tenure of workers; a result that is usually found when earnings functions are 
estimated and, following Mincer (1962), is usually interpreted as the productivity effect of 
general and job or firm-specific experience or ‘on-the-job training’. However, our estimation 
results show that age and tenure do not have a positive effect on the productivity of the firm. 
This indicates that the effects of age and experience on earnings merely reflect institutionalized 
salary-scale effects15 rather than real productivity effects.  
The results show that only some of the various HRM variables affect the average wage 
level and/or average productivity. Moreover, there are remarkable differences between the 
determinants of the wage level, and the determinants of productivity. With respect to the human-
capital variables, we find that assistants with high scores on computer skills have a higher 
productivity, whereas these computer skills do not affect the wage level. Conversely, high scores 
on sector-specific skills have a positive effect on the wage level, whereas these skills do not have 
a similar effect on productivity. This probably indicates that such occupational skills are highly 
valued by pharmacists, since these skills are thought to affect the quality of work, even though 
this is not reflected in the productivity of the firm. Moreover, we find that participation in 
additional training courses does not add anything to the effects of workers’ skill levels. Training 
of employees in the case of vacancies, however, seems to be an adequate HRM policy, since it 
increases the productivity of the pharmacy. 
 
 
                                                 
15. These salary scales are defined in the Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst Apotheken 2001 (Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Pharmacies 2001). 
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Table 2 
Results of Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression analysis 
 
 
 
Average wage level 
(ln) 
 
Prescription lines (ln) 
Variable B  t-value B  t - v a l u e 
Constant .291 *** 10.11 2.703 *** 14.86 
Firm characteristics       
• Type of pharmacy       
  - Independent (yes/no) -.002  -.19 .069  1.39 
  - Chain of less than 5 pharmacies (yes/no) .021 ** 2.12 -.022  -.37 
  - Chain of 5 or more pharmacies (ref.) -  - -  - 
• More than 10 employees (yes/no) .010 * 1.64 -.102 ** -2.74 
• Employment share of second pharmacists (ln) -  - .022 ** 3.08 
• Employment share of other employees (ln) -  - .025 ** 2.73 
Workforce characteristics       
• Assistants’ average age in years .006 *** 7.66 .001  .10 
• Assistants’ average job tenure in years .004 *** 3.83 -.002  -.25 
Technological and organizational innovations       
• New computer system (yes/no) .005  .69 -.018  -.39 
• Organizational changes (yes/no) .012 ** 1.99 .055  1.56 
• New products (yes/no) -.009  -1.07 -.079  -1.59 
• Increased customer orientation (yes/no) -.004  -.70 -.007  -.21 
Recruitment practices       
• Assistants with temporary contracts (%) -.001  -.65 -.003 ** -3.02 
• Offering higher wages to new assistants in case 
 of vacancies (yes/no) .019 ** 2.25 .013  .26 
Human capital (HRD)       
• Assistants’ score on general skills > 7.5 (yes/no) .001  .04 .023  .600 
• Assistants’ score on specific skills > 7.5 
 (yes/no) .014 ** 1.99 -.041  -.99 
• Assistants’ score computer skills > 7.5 (yes/no) -.007  -1.22 .083 ** 2.21 
       
• Number of general courses per assistant per 
 year -.010  -1.14 .006  .12 
• Number of specific courses per assistant per 
 year -.006  -1.50 .029  1.20 
• Number of computer courses per assistant per 
 year .009  .60 -.055  -.65 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Results of Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression analysis 
       
 
 
Average wage 
level (ln) 
Prescription lines (ln) 
 B  t-value B  t-value 
       
       
• Assistants follow courses in work time       
  - No courses (ref.) -  - -  - 
  - Few courses (yes/no) .001  .19 .005  .11 
  - Most courses (yes.no) .004  .44 -.034  -.71 
  - All courses (yes/no) .002  .15 -.121  -1.31 
• Training of employees in case of vacancies 
 (yes/no) .009  .95 .112 ** 2.03 
• Worker performance evaluation interview 
 (yes/no) .017 ** 2.51 -.030  -.78 
• Personal development plan for assistants 
 (yes/no) -.016  -1.37 -.111  -1.57 
Employability       
• Assistants performing tasks of pharmacist 
 (yes/no) .006  1.00 .026  .70 
• Assistants performing tasks of lower-level jobs 
 (yes/no) -.001  -.05 -.007  -.19 
• Assistants working overtime (yes/no) .010  1.49 .054  1.33 
Incentives       
• Performance pay (yes/no) .004  .43 .093 * 1.89 
Additional benefits       
• Additional childcare facilities (yes/no) .010  1.36 -.065  -1.51 
• Flexible working hours (yes/no) .003  .47 .019  .58 
• Number of ‘fringe benefits’         
- low (ref.) -  - -  - 
- medium (yes/no) -.009  -1.42 -.048  -1.30 
- high (yes/no) -.005  -.52 -.048  -.81 
Adjusted R2 
n 
.388 
345 
.193 
345 
* p < 0.10 ; **  p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01 
 
Another remarkable finding is that performance evaluation interviews have a positive effect 
on the wage level of assistants, but do not affect productivity. This indicates that these interviews 
are more favorable for workers than for the firm. Moreover, we find that pharmacies, which offer 
a higher wage to newly, recruited assistants in order to cope with their vacancy problems also 
have a higher wage level on average. This shows that higher wages for newly recruited assistants 
also increase the wages of the other workers, although this does not have a positive effect on 
productivity. Temporary contracts appear to have a negative effect on productivity, whereas 
there is no effect on the wage level. The latter could be expected because for workers with 
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temporary contracts, the limited duration of their contract is already a negative aspect of their 
contract.  
Moreover, we find that performance pay has a positive effect on the productivity of the 
firm, but does not affect the average wage level of the pharmacist’s assistants. Other HRM 
practices neither significantly affect wages nor productivity. This holds for task flexibility, the 
participation in training, childcare facilities as well as the miscellaneous “fringe benefits” offered 
to assistants by firms. The above-mentioned results obviously contradict our hypotheses 1a and 
2a and confirm the alternative hypotheses 1b and 2b, i.e.: the wage policies of the firms do not 
optimally result in the convergence of the interests of the workforce with firm interests. 
Our estimation results also show that technological developments neither affect wages nor 
productivity in the pharmacies, whereas organizational innovations have a weak significant 
positive effect on workers’ wages, although they do not affect the productivity of the firm. 
Finally, we find some effects of firm size characteristics: Apart from the control variables in 
equation 2 that take into account the additional workforce in the pharmacy, we find that in larger 
pharmacies (more than 10 employees) assistants are on average significantly less productive, 
although these larger pharmacies pay higher wages. Pharmacies that are part of a small chain of 
pharmacies also appear to pay higher wages to their pharmacy assistants.  
 
4.1 Human Resource Management Systems 
To analyze the effects of a more advanced HRM system on firm productivity and workers’ 
wages (Hypotheses 3a & 3b), we identify four HRM systems that map out a hierarchy from 
‘traditional’ to a HIM system (cf. Ichniowski et al., 1997). Table 3 describes the HRM practices 
included in the four systems. The first HRM system is the traditional system of personnel 
management in smaller firms in which no visible practices exist that focus on improving the 
performance of the assistants. 26 percent of the pharmacies belong to this group. The second 
HRM system refers to a ‘basic’ system that merely incorporates the practice of worker 
performance evaluation interviews. 30 percent of the pharmacies belong to this group. In the 
“intermediate” HRM system (the third system) more practices are included. Apart from the 
performance evaluation interviews, assistants in these pharmacies take courses to continually 
upgrade their knowledge and skills. Moreover, these pharmacies do not employ many assistants 
with temporary contracts, thereby increasing the commitment of the assistants to the 
organization. 41 percent of the pharmacies belong to this group. The fourth HRM system can be 
classified as a HIM system. Only 3 percent of the pharmacies have such a HIM system. Apart 
from the HRM practices incorporated in the third HRM system, these pharmacies employ 
assistants with a high average skill level (i.e. an average score of 7.5 or higher on a 10-point 
scale for all 10 skills distinguished). In these pharmacies, (some) assistants also perform tasks of 
the pharmacist. Moreover, the assistants in these pharmacies have a higher participation in 
additional training: on average they take at least one course a year. These pharmacies also 
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stimulate training participation by allowing assistants to work on their coursework during work 
hours. 
It should be noted, however, that we did not include variables on the presence of teamwork, job 
rotation, and quality circles in the survey, since these HPW practices are not relevant for Dutch 
pharmacies where all assistants work together in a small team without any hierarchy apart from 
the role of the pharmacists. For this reason we qualify the most advanced HRM system in the 
Dutch pharmacies as a HIM system. 
 
Table 3 
Description of indicators included in the four HRM systems distinguished 
 
Indicator  
 
 
% 
 
  
HRM system 1: Traditional system 26 
 • No HRM practices that focus on improving performance  
  
HRM system 2: Basic HRM system 30 
 •Worker performance evaluation interviews  
  
HRM system 3: Intermediate HRM system 41 
 •Worker performance evaluation interviews  
 •Assistants follow courses  
 •Percentage of assistants with temporary contracts lower than 20%  
  
HRM system 4: High Involvement Management 3 
Worker performance evaluation interviews  
 •Percentage of assistants with temporary contracts lower than 20%  
 •Assistants follow on average 1 course a year  
 •Assistants follow courses in work time  
 •Assistants’ average score on skills higher than 7.5  
 •Assistants perform tasks of pharmacist  
  
 
 
Equation 3 and 4, that are again considered as a set of Zellner’s ‘seemingly unrelated regression 
equations’, include the HRM system applied by the firm instead of the various individual HRM 
practices:  
  
iiiii XTIHRMSLW 3
'
33
'
33)/(ln εµγβα ++++=  (3) 
iiiiii LZXTIHRMSLP 4
'
4
'
44
'
44 )/ln()/(ln εφµγβα +++++=  (4) 
 
HRMSi = Human Resource Management System in firm i  
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  Table 4 
  Results of Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression analysis on the effects of HRM systems 
 Average wage level 
(ln) 
Recipe lines (ln) 
Variable 
 
B  t-value B  t-value 
 
Constant 
Firm characteristics 
• Type of pharmacy 
 - Independent (yes/no) 
 - Chain of less than 5 pharmacies (yes/no) 
 - Chain of 5 or more pharmacies (ref.) 
• More than 10 employees (yes/no) 
• Employment share of second pharmacists  (ln) 
• Employment share of other employees (ln) 
Workforce characteristics 
• Assistants’ average age in years 
• Assistants’ average job tenure in years 
Technological and organizational innovations 
• New computer system (yes/no) 
• Organizational changes (yes/no) 
HRM system 
 - HRM system 1 – Traditional system (ref.) 
 - HRM system 2 – Basic system 
 - HRM system 3 – Intermediate system 
 - HRM system 4 – HIM 
 
.270 
 
 
.001 
.020 
- 
.009 
- 
- 
 
.007 
.004 
 
.006 
.008 
 
- 
.023 
.010 
.045 
 
*** 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
 
** 
 
10.27 
 
 
.12 
1.96 
- 
1.59 
- 
- 
 
9.08 
3.62 
 
.80 
1.37 
 
- 
3.03 
1.47 
2.44 
 
2.688 
 
 
.096 
-.010 
- 
-.123 
.026 
.022 
 
.002 
-.003 
 
-.041 
.037 
 
- 
-.018 
-.022 
.140 
 
*** 
 
 
* 
 
 
** 
*** 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.39 
 
 
1.88 
-.155 
- 
-3.42 
3.50 
2.34 
 
.43 
-.46 
 
-0.89 
1.06 
 
- 
-.38 
-.53 
1.26 
 
Adjusted R2 
n 
 
 
.35 
345 
 
.10 
345 
* p  < 0.10; ** p  < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of the equations 4 and 5. We find that assistants benefit 
from more advanced HRM systems by means of higher wages. Our estimation results show there 
are two significant thresholds. Worker performance evaluation interviews are a first step, 
whereas assistants benefit the most from a HIM system. 
However, the estimation results show that pharmacies with a more advanced HRM system 
do experience higher productivity. This indicates that a more advanced HRM system has 
different effects for the assistants, and the pharmacy that employs them (Hypothesis 3b). In this 
sense, a more advanced HRM system does not stimulate the convergence of the interests of 
workers with firm interests. This indicates an important threshold in the diffusion of more 
advanced HRM systems among the pharmacies. 
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5 Conclusions and discussion 
In this study, we analyzed the effects of HRM policies in Dutch pharmacies. We focused on the 
question of whether the effects of HRM practices on workers’ wages and firm productivity are 
similar or different. We found considerable differences between the determinants of pharmacist’s 
assistants’ wages, and the determinants of the productivity of the pharmacies. Wages appeared to 
be strongly related to job tenure and age; a result that is usually interpreted as the productivity 
effect of on-the-job training. However, we found that both age and tenure do not have a positive 
effect on the productivity of the firm. This indicates that the effects of experience and age on 
earnings in Dutch pharmacies merely reflect institutionalized salary-scale effects rather than real 
productivity effects.  
Similar to the results of other studies, we found that most specific HRM practices neither 
affect workers’ wages nor the productivity of the firm. However, our estimation results show 
interesting differences between the effects of workers’ performance evaluation interviews on the 
two performance measures, since these interviews have a positive effect on workers’ wages, but 
do not affect the productivity of the firm. Apparently workers profit more from these interviews 
than does the firm itself. For performance pay we find the opposite pattern. It has a positive 
effect on the productivity of the firm, whereas it does not affect the average wage level of the 
workers.  
In addition, the skills of the workers are not rewarded according to their relevance for the 
productivity of the firm. We found a positive effect of workers’ computer skills on the 
productivity of the firm, whereas this is not reflected in workers’ wages. Conversely, high scores 
on sector-specific skills have a positive effect on the wage level, whereas these skills do not 
affect workers’ productivity.  
These results contradict our hypotheses 1a and 2a, and confirm the alternative hypotheses 
1b and 2b. The remarkable differences we found between the determinants of the wage level of 
the assistants, and the determinants of productivity of the firm clearly indicate that the wage 
policy of the pharmacies does not stimulate a convergence of interests between the firm and its 
workforce. To a large extent this is due to the fact that workers’ earnings merely reflect 
institutionalized salary-scale effects rather than real productivity effects.  This indicates that 
pharmacies could gain from aligning their wage policies with a worker’s contribution to firm 
performance. 
Our results on the effects of a more advanced HRM system confirm hypothesis 3b. As in 
some other studies we do not find any effect of an advanced HRM system on firm performance. 
More remarkable, however, is our result that workers benefit more from an advanced HRM 
system than does the firm itself. The former might indicate that more advanced HRM policies 
increase the effects of the institutionalized salary-scales. This could be an important threshold in 
the diffusion of a more advanced HRM system. This may particularly hold for smaller firms for 
which the salary-scales are determined by collective bargaining at the sector level.  
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Our finding that firm performance does not benefit from a more advanced HRM system 
might, however, also be due to time lags between the implementation of a more advanced HRM 
system, and any subsequent change in firm performance (Huselid & Becker, 1996). Since some 
of the pharmacies might have introduced particular HRM practices more recently our estimation 
results might underestimate the effect on these firms’ productivity. However, in that case it is 
still remarkable that the workers benefit from a more advanced HRM system without any delay.  
Since the data we used are cross-sectional, our estimation results may suffer from a 
negative selectivity effect for which we could not control. As shown by Wolf & Zwick (2002) a 
negative selectivity effect may occur because less productive firms have an incentive to 
introduce a more productive HRM strategy. However, it should be noted that pharmacies are 
small firms that serve a local market that offers few opportunities to increase their level of 
production by means of a more advanced HRM system (Batt, 2002). Small firms also have no 
possibilities to profit from delayering the organization, which is one of the reasons why a 
HIM/HPW system might increase productivity in large firms. More generally, our finding that 
firm performance does not benefit from a more advanced HRM system could be explained on the 
grounds that, in small firms, formal HRM policies are less important for workers’ productivity 
levels than the personal relations between employer and employees. An alternative explanation 
might be that it may be very difficult to create a real HPW in a pharmacy setting. Although the 
assistants are professionals who usually work in a team, the pharmacist will not only act as a 
manager, but also is the ‘dominant’ professional. Therefore, although the assistants obviously do 
not have ‘Taylorist jobs’, their autonomy will, to some extent, be restricted by the professional 
authority of the pharmacist, which may limit the potential effects of a HIM/HPW system on the 
performance of the firm.  
Our estimation results show that pharmacies could gain from aligning their wage policies 
with workers’ contribution to firm performance. This indicates that employers are not well 
informed regarding the impact of the various HRD/HRM practices on firm performance. 
Research in this field can therefore be very worthwhile for the employers concerned. This 
probably mainy holds for small and medium sized firms. Unfortunately, sector studies on the 
effects of HRM practices cannot be conclusive regarding the extent to which the results found 
can be generalized to other sectors in the economy. This raises the need for more empirical 
research on the effects of HRM policies in small or medium size firms. Moreover, as the 
majority of the working population in the Western world is employed in these smaller firms, 
further empirical research on the effects of HRM practices in these firms may also significantly 
contribute to our understanding of the thresholds in the diffusion of more advanced HRM 
systems in the various sectors of the economy. 
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